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1 Introduction
Black Monday, as October 19, 1987, became known, was not just another
day; it was the single worst day (in percentage terms) in the Dow’s history
and therefore unique. (Estrada, 2009).
Indeed, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) index sustained a 22.6% loss
on Black Monday. However, large daily swings that are neither unique, unusual nor
as dramatic have a substantial impact on stock market returns. Events such as wars,
terrorism, and bankruptcy are known as “black swans”.1 According to Taleb (2007),
a black swan is an event with three attributes: (i) It is an outlier, lying outside the
realm of regular expectations because nothing in the past can convincingly point to
its occurrence; (ii) it carries an extreme impact; and (iii) despite being an outlier,
plausible explanations for its occurrence can be found after the fact, thus implying
that it is explainable and predictable.
Failing to take explicit account of the fact that such extraordinary movements have
occurred in the past – and will occur in the future – is therefore a serious omission
(Friedman and Laibson, 1989). Several studies analyze the financial market reactions
to major events, by focusing on one type of event. For example, Schwert (1989b,
1990) examine the effect of the 1987 stock market crash, Frey and Kucher (2000)
and Choudhry (2010) study the impact of events during World War II, Amihud and
Wohl (2004), Rigobon and Sack (2005) and Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2009) explore
the impact of the Iraq War, Berkman, Jacobsen and Lee (2011) study the impact of
rare disasters, Schwert (1981), Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002), Bomfim (2003),
Birz and Lott (2011) and Rangel (2011) investigate macroeconomic announcements,
Akhigbe, Martin and Whyte (2005) analyze the effect of the Worldcom bankruptcy,
Chen and Siems (2004) and Chesney, Reshetar and Karaman (2011) study the
impact of terrorism, Nierderhoffer, Gibbs and Bullock (1970), Reilly and Luksetich
(1980), Foerster and Schmitz (1997), Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003), Bialkowski,
1See Taylor and Williams (2009) and Olson et al. (2012) for a discussion of “black swans” in the
money market.
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Gottschalk and Wisniewski (2008) and Jones and Banning (2009) look at the effect
of presidential elections, and Nierderhoffer (1971) explores the impact of Presidential
illnesses. Most of these studies analyze the effects of events on financial markets where
the dates are known, most often using event study methodology.
Other studies purport to identify major shocks due to “unknown” events that affect the
stock markets before examining their implications. For example, Bloom (2009) uses
the VXO index of implied volatility (1986–2008) as a proxy for uncertainty to show
that uncertainty dramatically increases after major economic and political shocks. He
defines majors shocks as those with volatility more than 1.65 standard deviations above
the Hodrick–Prescott detrended mean of volatility. Wang et al. (2009) investigate
the causes and effects of the eight largest stock market crashes (1962–2007). They
define them as a minimum one-day decrease of 5% in the daily value-weighted market
index returns of stocks included in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
database. Barro and Ursúa (2009) define stock-market crashes as cumulative multi-
year returns of -25% or less when studying the relation between stock-market crashes
and depressions on long-term data (1869–2006) from Global Financial Data. They
include the variables in a rare-disaster model to explain the equity premium (Barro,
2006). Cutler et al. (1989) analyze the fifty largest stock movements in the S&P
Composite Stock Index (1947–1987) which are defined as the largest one-day returns
(daily changes).
Another way to identify black swans or (infrequent) large shocks is intervention anal-
ysis, introduced by Box and Tiao (1975) to attempt to statistically appraise these types
of shocks. Intervention analysis is used to assess the impact of a known or unknown
event on the time series. The main focus is to estimate the dynamic effect of such
events on the series.2 No attempt is made here to formally define a black swan. In-
tervention analysis forms the basis for many outlier modelling procedures. A number
of procedures have been developed to identify these outliers on linear models (e.g.,
2Balke and Fomby (1994), Charles and Darné (2006), and Darné and Charles (2011) use intervention
analysis in a linear framework to identify large infrequent shocks in macroeconomic and financial times
series.
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Tsay, 1986; Chang, Tiao and Chen, 1988; Chen and Liu, 1993). Nevertheless, it is
well known that the world is not linear, and neither are financial data. Such extreme
movements (in returns) are potentially important in finance and financial economics,
especially in modelling volatility of returns, which are an important key to risk man-
agement, derivative pricing and hedging, market making, market timing, portfolio se-
lection, monetary policy making, and many other financial activities. Several authors
consider outliers in nonlinear setting, especially from autoregressive conditionally het-
eroscedastic (ARCH) models introduced by Engle (1982) and extended to generalized
ARCH (GARCH) by Bollerslev (1986) (see, e.g., Sakata and White, 1998; Franses
and Ghijsels, 1999; Franses and van Dijk, 2000; Charles and Darné, 2005; Doornik
and Ooms, 2005; Zhang and King, 2005; Hotta and Tsay, 2012). The GARCHmodels,
a well-known time-varying variance specification, have been developed to capture the
two most important stylized facts of returns of financial assets, which are heavy-tailed
distribution and volatility clustering.
In this paper, the detection and identification of large shocks in volatility of the
DJIA index spanning October 2, 1928 to August 30, 2013 results from the semi-
parametric procedure to detect additive outliers proposed by Laurent, Lecourt and
Palm (LLP) (2013) based on the GJR model of Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle
(1993) that accounts for the so-called leverage effect.3 We determine when these
(positive and negative) large changes in volatility of daily returns occur during the
period. We use a moving subsample (10 years) window to take into account the dif-
ferent volatility levels of the DJIA in the detection of the large shocks, namely periods
with high volatility and periods with low volatility. This approach allows thus to iden-
tify large shocks as extraordinary movements perceived by the investors. The larger
changes in percentage have different consequences and perceptions when the market is
within a high volatility period compared with a low volatility period or a stable period,
3Stock returns exhibit some degree of asymmetry in their conditional variances, i.e. that market
participants overreact to bad news as compared to good news (Black, 1976; Christie, 1982; French,
Schwert and Stambaugh, 1987; Bollerslev, Chow, and Kroner, 1992).
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especially in a context of uncertainty about the future profitability of equities and their
risk. We try to associate the date of each outlier with a specific (economic, political or
financial) event that occurred near that date, and many of them seem to be associated
with the same event patterns. We find that large shocks in volatility of the DJIA are
principally due to major financial crashes (1929, 1987, and 1997-98), US elections,
wars (e.g., Spanish Civil War, World War II, Korean war, and Gulf war), monetary
policy during recessions, macroeconomic news and declarations about the economic
situation, terrorist attacks, bankruptcy, and regulation. We also find that some negative
and positive high returns experienced by the DJIA are not identified as outliers, namely
as extraordinary (rare) movements, due to the very high volatility of some periods (see,
e.g., Officer, 1973; Schwert, 1989a). This can be explained by differing consequences
and perceptions of the investors on larger changes in percentage when the market is
within a high volatility period compared with a low volatility period or a stable period.
For example, a percentage change of  4% in returns will be not perceived in the same
way by the investors when the market is within a high or a low volatility period. This
percentage change considered as a significant shock under a low volatility regime may
become insignificant under a high volatility regime. Therefore, we use the iterative
cumulative sums of squares (ICSS) algorithm proposed by Inclán and Tiao (1994) and
improved by Sansó et al. (2004) to identify sudden shifts in volatility of the DJIA. We
find different regime changes in volatility (high, medium and low volatility), especially
episodes of high volatility occurring in 1929-1934, 1937-1938 and 2007-2011. Fur-
ther, in contrast to Schwert (2011), we show that the period of the 2007-08 financial
crisis and the related recession (2007-2011) exhibit the same characteristic than the
1929-1934 recession period: very high levels of volatility on prolonged periods (many
years).
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology
identifying outliers based on a conditional heteroscedasticity model. The empirical
framework is discussed in Section 3, along with the events associated with infrequent
5
large shocks in DJIA volatility. Section 4 presents volatility changes in the DJIA. A
discussion on outliers and risk management is given in Section 5. The conclusion is
drawn in Section 6.
2 Outlier detection in GJR model
Several studies have showed that financial data may be affected by contaminated
observations (Balke and Fomby, 1994; Charles and Darné, 2005). This type of
observations, called outliers, reflects extraordinary, infrequently occurring events or
shocks that have important effects on macroeconomic and financial time series. There
are several methods for detecting outliers in nonlinear setting, such as the method for
additive jumps detection proposed by Franses and Ghijsels (1999) and Franses and van
Dijk (2000). Here we use the semi-parametric procedure to detect additive outliers
proposed by Laurent, Lecourt and Palm (LLP) (2013).4 Their test is similar to the
non-parametric tests for jumps proposed by Lee and Mykland (2008) and Andersen,
Bollerslev, and Dobrev (2007) for daily data. This method allows us to examine the
large shocks that affected the DJIA returns.
Consider the returns series rt , which is defined by rt = logPt   logPt 1, where Pt
is the observed price at time t, and consider the ARMA(p,q)-GARCH(1,1) model
f(L)(rt  µ) = q(L)et or rt = µt + et ; (1)
et = zt
q
s2t ;
et  N(0;
q
s2t ); zt  i:i:d:N(0;1);
s2t = w+a1e
2
t 1+b1s
2
t 1
where L is the lag operator, f(L) = 1  åpi=1fiLi and q(L) = 1  åqi=1 qiLi are
4Laurent et al. (2013) critic the sequential test for outliers proposed by Franses and Ghijsels (1999) in
two ways: (i) the critical values have to be simulated and depend on some unknown parameter values of
the GARCH model and therefore the size of the test can not be controlled; and (ii) the test suffers from
the so-called outlier masking problem because it is based on a Quasi-Maximum Likelihood estimate of
the GARCH model, which is known to be non-robust to additive outliers (Carnero et al., 2007, 2012).
They show that their test does not suffer from those drawbacks.
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polynomials of orders p and q, respectively, such that µt = µ+å¥i=1liet i is the
conditional mean of rt , where li’s are the coefficients of l(L) = f 1(L)q(L) =
1+å¥i=1liLi, and s2t is the conditional variance of rt .
Consider the return series with an independent additive outlier component atIt , with
outlier size at
rt = rt +atIt (2)
where rt denotes observed financial returns and It is generated by some outlier process
such as a Poisson process. The model for rt has the properties that an outlier atIt
will not affect s2t+1 (the conditional variance of rt+1), and it allows for non-Gaussian
fat-tailed conditional distributions of rt .
Let us denote eµt and est estimates of µt and s2t in equations (1) and (2) that are robust
to the potential presence of the additive outliers atIt (i.e. estimated on rt and not
on rt). The robust estimations of eµt and est are based on the bounded innovation
propagation (BIP)-ARMA proposed by Muler, Peña and Yohai (2009) and the BIP-
GARCH(1,1) proposed by Muler and Yohai (2008), respectively.The BIP-ARMA and
BIP-GARCH(1,1) are defined as
eµt = µ+ ¥å
i=1
liwMPY ( eJt i) (3)
es2t = w+a1es2t 1cdwMPYkd eJt 12+b1es2t 1; (4)
where wMPYkd (:) is the weight function, and cd a factor ensuring the conditional
expectation of the weighted squared unexpected shocks to be the conditional variance
of rt in absence of jumps (Boudt et al., 2013). Laurent et al. (2013) extend the BIP-
GARCH to the BIP-GJR(1,1), i.e. the robust version of the GJR(1,1) model of Glosten,
Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993) that accounts for the so-called leverage effect, i.e.
es2t = w+a1es2t 1cdwMPYkd eJt 12+ g1Dt 1es2t 1cdwMPYkd eJt 12+b1es2t 1; (5)
where Dt 1 = 1 if eJt 1 < 0, and 0 otherwise.
Consider the standardized return on day t
eJt = rt  eµtest (6)
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The outliers detection rule is as follow
eIt = Ij eJt j> k (7)
where I(:) is the indicator function, with eIt = 1 when an outlier is detected at
observation t and 0 otherwise, and k is a suitable critical value. The critical values
are defined by
k = gT;l =  log(  log(1 l))bT + cT ; (8)
with bT = 1=
p
2logT , and cT = (2logT )1=2   [logp+ log(logT )]=[2(2logT )1=2].
They show that their test do not suffer from size distortions irrespectively of the
parameter values of the GJR model from Monte Carlo simulations. Following Laurent
et al. (2013) we set l = 0:5. Given eIt , detected outliers can be filtered out from rt as
follows: ert = rt   (rt  eµt)eIt .
3 Empirical study
3.1 Data description
In this section, we examine the DJIA stock market5 index spanning the October 2,
1928 to August 30, 2013, namely 21,409 observations. We consider the daily clos-
ing prices as the daily observations. Throughout the study, returns are calculated as
rt = 100 (logPt  logPt 1), with rt the log-return of each day, and Pt the index level
5The DJIA is the most-quoted market indicator in newspapers, on TV and on the Internet, and one
of most important indexes of the NYSE. Because of its longevity, it became the first to be quoted by
other publications. Besides longevity, two other factors play a role in its widespread popularity: It is
understandable to most people, and it reliably indicates the basic market trend. The DJIA is comprised
by 30 companies that are all prominent in their industries. The calculation of the DJIA is weighted price
rather than market capitalization. The component weightings are therefore affected only by changes in
the stock prices, in contrast with other indices (such as Nasdaq 100 and S&P 500), whose weightings
are affected by both changes in price and in the number of shares outstanding. Note that the DJIA can
not be considered as a benchmark of US stock market due to the fact that the DJIA incorporates a small
number of components and is based on large caps. It is more considered as a large caps index. We thank
the referee for this comment.
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at day t. Figure 1 plots the returns of the DJIA. This approach is justified because
the thrust of the study is an investigation of market volatility. Subperiod analysis is
also appropriate because stock return data may not exhibit stationary covariance over
long periods (see Pagan and Schwert, 1990). Accordingly, in this study we consider a
10-year rolling window (about 2,500 observations).6
We apply the identification procedure of additive outliers in a GJR model for the
series of returns.7 Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the non-adjusted and outlier-
adjusted return series. The non-adjusted returns are highly non-normal, i.e. showing
evidence of negative excess skewness and excess kurtosis. They are leptokurtic
(i.e., fat-tailed distribution). The variance of the index prices is thus principally
due to infrequent but extreme deviations. The Lagrange Multiplier test for the
presence of the ARCH effect clearly indicates that the prices show strong conditional
heteroscedasticity, which is a common feature of financial data. In other words,
there are quiet periods with small price changes and turbulent periods with large
oscillations. The outlier-adjusted returns also exhibit excess kurtosis and conditional
heteroscedasticity, although the excess kurtosis decreases dramatically. However, the
excess skewness becomes insignificant, suggesting, as shown by Carnero et al. (2001)
and Charles and Darné (2005), that outliers may cause significant skewness.
3.2 A brief history of large shocks in DJIA volatility
All detected outliers are given in Tables 1-4, by timing and t-statistics as well as
point and percent changes. A number of outliers is found in the daily DJIA – 47
outliers – during the whole period. The probability of a large shock is 0.22%, with 33
negative (70%) and 14 positive (30%) large shocks, suggesting that returns are more
affected by negative large shocks than positive large shocks. We also try to associate
the date of each outlier with a specific (economic, political or financial) event that
6We used different window’s lengths and we obtained the same results.
7We also applied the Bai-Perron test for detecting structural breaks in returns but we found no break.
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occurred near that date, presenting the outlier dates in chronological order.8 In the
following subsections, since many of the identified outliers seem to be associated
with the same event patterns we discuss the events using a classification of these
patterns: financial crises, elections, wars, monetary policy during the recessions,
macroeconomic news and declarations on the economic situation, terrorist attacks,
bankruptcy and investigation, regulation, and politico-economic conflicts.
Further, Table 7 displays the 20 largest percentage changes and losses of the DJIA
between October 1928 and June 2009. This table updates and completes the work of
Schwert (1998) who present the 25 largest daily decreases.9 The worst single day in
percentage change is October 19, 1987, at  22:61%. We also find that some negative
and positive high returns experienced by the DJIA are not identified as outliers, namely
as extraordinary (rare) movements, due to the very high volatility of some periods (see,
e.g., Officer, 1973; Schwert, 1989a). This can be explained by differing consequences
and perceptions of the investors on larger changes in percentage when the market is
within a high volatility period compared with a low volatility period or a stable period,
especially in a context of uncertainty about the future profitability of equities and their
risk. A percentage change of  4% in returns is not perceived in the same way by the
investors when the market is within a high or a low volatility period.
3.2.1 Financial crises
1929 Stock Market Crash. The crash of 1929 struck the NYSE between the October
24 and 29, 1929.10 This event marks the start of the Great Depression. On the day
of the crash on October 24, 1929 (Black Thursday), a record-breaking 13 million
8The events associated with outliers are gathered from financial newspapers. Most of them are also
found by Cutler et al. (1989) when analyzing the largest stock movements in the S&P Composite Stock
Index on the 1947–1987 period.
9See also the Dow Jones website for a list of the largest daily (point and percentage) changes in the
DJIA: http://www.djaverages.com.
10See, e.g., White (1990), Rappoport and White (1993), Galbraith (1997) and Bierman (1998) for a
discussion of the 1929 stock market crash. See also Shachmurove (2012) for a historical overview of
financial crisis in the US.
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shares were traded, indicating panic. In the afternoon, five banks contributed about
$20 million each to buy stock and restore confidence in the market. However, new
accumulation of sale orders slumped on the market during the weekend, triggering a
severe fall of the DJIA ( 13:47%) on October 28, 1929 (Black Monday). This fall was
broad based and did not spare securities of excellent quality (blue chip stocks). During
the meeting, a conference of the bankers was held, yet it soothed the stock market only
momentarily; investors believed thought that the banks were powerless to stop the fall.
On October 29, 1929 (Black Tuesday), the DJIA collapsed by  11:73%. This severe
fall can be explained by the fact that in the middle of the meeting, panic occurred
when the market learned of the failure of the Curb brokerage firm. The major banks
and financial giants continued their efforts to stem the fall by buying large quantities of
stocks to demonstrate their confidence in the market to the public, but their efforts were
futile. In addition, the Morgan Bank and several other establishments announced that
they would charge their customers a cover of only 25%. The wall Street Management
Committee held a meeting during which the possibility of closing the Stock Exchange
(next Saturday) was examined, but finally decided that the Saturday meeting would
take place. The Federal Bank Reserve of New York appeared determined to lower
the rate of the rediscount from 6% to 5% on Thursday. In the interim, it still reduced
the rate of acceptances by 18%. The general feeling was slightly less pessimistic. The
investors believed that the support actions of the banks would be effective.
Wall Street began to recover from this crisis on October 30, 1929 (+12.34% for the
DJIA), nearly offsetting the fall of the previous day. This recovery is due to massive
purchases carried out by banks, investment trusts and insurance companies. The
governors of the Stock Exchange decided to close on Friday and Saturday to allow
the personnel to rest.
The President Hoover’s announcement that he would sign the Hawley-Smoot Tariff
Act on imported goods on June 16, 1930, involved the fall of the DJIA by  7:87%.
On June 22, 1931, the DJIA rose to 11:90% which can be attributed to President Her-
bert Hoover’s proposal of a one-year moratorium on $250 billion of war debt owed to
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the US government by foreign powers. This plan was regarded as the most construc-
tive economic development in two years, and was expected to stabilize international
conditions tremendously. A strong rise occurred on October 6, 1931, driven by the
noise of the formation of a powerful banking syndicate whose the aim was to repos-
sess some assets immobilized in several large financial institutions (+14.87% for the
DJIA).
1987 Stock Market Crash. On October 19, 1987, the DJIA sustained a  22:61%
collapse (the largest one-day drop in the history of major stock market indexes from
1928 through the end of 2010), known as “Black Monday”.11 This spectacular fall can
be explained by the declarations of Treasury Secretary James Baker on the week-end,
threatening Germany, which raised its interest rates, that it would decrease the dollar
further. In this case, the Louvre Accord on the stabilization of currency values could
be called into question. Therefore, the investors feared a new fall of the dollar and
that the government did not support the dollar. The situation was worsened by the
Iran-American conflict in the Persian Gulf.
On October 21, 1987, the DJIA rose by+10:15% due to the additional decline of inter-
est rates and President Ronald Reagan’s stated intention to seek, jointly with Congress,
the means of reducing the budget deficit. For investors, this implied the shift from an
anti-inflationary policy to an anti-recession policy.
1997-1998 Asian and Russian Crises. The Asian crisis started in Thailand with the
financial collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997, and spread through the economies of
Southeast Asia. Notably, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange fell steadily (the Hang Seng
index lost 33.4% in eight days). Wall Street suffered accordingly, with a loss of 7.18%
for the DJIA on October 27, 1997. This plunge obliged the NYSE to stop quotations
temporarily; it was the first time in US history that these mechanisms, adopted after
the crash of 1987, were applied.12
11See Schwert (1989b, 1990) and Carlson (2006) for a discussion of the 1987 stock market crash.
12In response to the market crisis of October 1987 the NYSE instituted circuit breakers to reduce
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The Russian crisis (also called the “Ruble crisis”) was triggered by the Asian financial
crisis and entailed a collapse of the Russian currency (ruble) along with a default of
the short-term Russian Government Treasury Bills (the GKO). This caused the Long
Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund to default on several billion dollars of
financial contracts. On August 26, 1998, the Russian Central Bank terminated ruble-
dollar trading on the MICEX (Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange). The strong
fall of the DJIA (-6.37%) on August 31, 1998, can be explained by a combination of
the deterioration of the Russian and Asian crises along with the announcement of bad
economic news, namely the declines of both firm profits and household consumption
in July (-0.2%), which confirmed the slowdown of growth in the US.
3.2.2 Elections
Presidential elections. The rise of the DJIA (+4.37%) on November 7, 1940, can
be attributed to the re-election of the President Franklin Roosevelt, who ran against
Republican Wendell Willkie. The Democrat majority to the Senate and the House of
Representatives was also preserved.
The victory of Democrat Harry Truman over Republican Thomas Dewey on November
3, 1948, caused a decline on Wall Street (-3.85% for the DJIA) because investors
expected a Republican win. The fear of reestablishment of income taxes by the
Democrats can explain the fall of the DJIA (-3.34%) on November 5, 1948.
President’s Health and Assassination. The large movements of the stock market
in September 1955, are due to the illness of President Dwight Eisenhower. The
volatility and promote investor confidence. When the DJIA loses 350 points, quotations are suspended for
half an hour. The suspension is increased to one hour if the loses are of 550 points. These measurements
are supposed to give the operators time to reflect and calm themselves during periods of high market
volatility. The SEC approved amendments to Rule 80B (Trading Halts Due to Extraordinary Market
Volatility) – effective on April 15, 1998 – which revised the halt provisions and the circuit-breaker levels.
The trigger levels for a market-wide trading halt were set at 10%, 20% and 30% of the DJIA, calculated
at the beginning of each calendar quarter, using the average closing value of the DJIA for the prior month,
thereby establishing specific point values for the quarter.
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announcement of his heart attack prompted a plunge in the DJIA (-6.54%) on
September 26, 1955. In the following days, Wall Street responded strongly to major
news concerning the President’s health: good news on September 27, 1955 (+2.28%
for the DJIA) and bad news on October 10, 1955 (-2.92% for the DJIA).13
The assassination of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas triggered the fall of the DJIA
(-2.89%) on November 22, 1963. The governor of the NYSE closed the market 30
minutes early due to huge selling orders. The arrest of President Kennedy’s assassin
can explain the increase on Wall Street on November 26, 1963 (+4.69% for the DJIA),
coupled with along the confidence in Vice-President Lyndon Johnson.
3.2.3 Wars
Spanish Civil War. The political situation in Europe, especially the civil war in Spain
(the Nationalists marched on Barcelona and conquered Catalonia a few days later),
and the deceleration of industrial activity can explain the fall of the DJIA (-5.52%) on
January 23, 1939.
World War II. On July 26, 1934, the fear of war among some of the important
European powers due to the Austrian situation implied the collapse of Wall Street
( 6:62% for the DJIA). On October 5, 1937, the DJIA plummeted by  5:33%
due to the interpretations of the speech by President Franklin Roosevelt in Chicago
concerning the positions of the US regarding a possible international conflict. Indeed,
the Quarantine Speech given by the President Franklin Roosevelt called for an
international “quarantine of the aggressor nations” as an alternative to the political
climate of American neutrality and isolationism that was prevalent at the time. The
speech was a response to aggressive actions by Italy and Japan, and suggests the use
of economic pressure, a forceful response, but less direct than outright aggression.
After the invasion of Poland by Germany on September 1, 1939, Australia, France,
13Nierderhoffer (1971) studies the relation between Presidential illnesses and stock prices. He shows
that there is a strong and consistent stock price movement in the case of death or serious illness
of a president. Nierderhoffer finds that out of five president’s sickness from 1916 to 1964, Dwight
Eisenhower’s sickness affected securities prices the most.
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New Zealand and United Kingdom declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939.
Therefore, on September 5, 1939, traders executed a high volume of purchases to
benefit from “war boom” prices, propelling a rise in the DJIA (+9.52%).14 The fall
of the DJIA (-4.06%) on September 17, 1939, was caused by the invasion of Poland
by the Soviet Union (under the pretext of protecting the Ukrainian and Belorussian
minorities). The successive falls of the DJIA (-2.30%, -4.93%, -6.80%, -4.78%, and
-6.78%) between May 10 to 21, 1940, are due to World War II in Europe, notably
the German offensive against France and invasion of the neutral nations of Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, the flight of Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands
and her government to London, the surrender of the Dutch army, the flight of the
Belgian government after Brussels fell to German forces and the fact that German
forces reached the English Channel. The declaration of President Franklin Roosevelt
concerning the material help accorded to the Allies prompted a rise in the DJIA
(+4.73%) on June 12, 1940.
Korean War. The falls of the DJIA on June 1950 can be explained by the Korean
War. North Korea attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950, signaling the outbreak of
the Korean War (-4.64% for the DJIA), and North Korean tanks entered Seoul on June
27, 1950 (-3.71% for the DJIA), prompting investors to fear a long war.
Gulf War. The rise of the DJIA (+4.57%) on January 17, 1991, was caused by
Gulf War I, with the launching of the operation Desert Storm, in particular with the
announcement of the success of the US air raids against Iraq.
14Choudhry (2010) investigates the potential effects of the WWII events on the movements of the DJIA
stock price index and returns volatility. Events during a war affect the equity markets in two ways: (i) it
can increase or decrease the price of shares and the returns volatility, (ii) it can alter the uncertainty of the
investors about the future profitability of the equities and their risk.
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3.2.4 Monetary Policy during Recessions15
1969–1970 Recession. The increase in the DJIA (+3.85%) on August 16, 1971 is
due to the anti-inflationary program of the President Richard Nixon, which specifies
a series of drastic economic measures (tight monetary policy) including a wage-price
freeze, intended to lift the US out of its 1969–1970 recession.
1981–1982 Recession. The rise of the DJIA (+4.05%) on August 17, 1982, can be
explained by the interest rate decline and the debt crisis due to the announcement by
Latin American countries, especially Mexico, that they could not repay their foreign
debt. An expectation of further declines in interest rates to help the economy recover
can explain the rise of the DJIA (+4.09%) on October 6, 1982.
1991-2001 Expansion. The fall of DJIA (-2.43%) on April 02, 1994, can be explained
by the Fed’s surprise announcement that it rises US interest rates for the first time in
five years. The announcement of the surprisingly sharp rise in job numbers, suggesting
no further US interest rate cuts can explained the fall of DJIA (-3.05%) on March 09,
1996.
3.2.5 Macroeconomic News and Declarations on the Economic Situation
1938-1945 Expansion. On April 9, 1943, President Franklin Roosevelt’s anti-inflation
order governing prices and wages can explain the drop in the DJIA (-3.17%).
1946-1948 Expansion. The declines in the DJIA (-5.56%) on September 3, 1946, can
be explained by labor unrest in the maritime and trucking industries. The fall of the
DJIA (-3.89%) on April 14, 1947, can be explained by the worsening of the economic
situation and the fear of new strikes.
1961-1969 Expansion. The large movements in May and June 1962 can be explained
by the economic situation. President John F. Kennedy forced the rollback of a steel
price hike, which may explain the fall of the DJIA (-5.71%) on May 28, 1962, because
investors saw this decision as a rethinking of the principle of free enterprise.
15See Mishkin and White (2002) for a discussion of the implications for monetary policy of the stock
market crashes.
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1982-1990 Expansion. The fall of DJIA (-3.26%) on July 07, 1986, can be explained
by a fear on the health of the US economy due to negative factors, primarily weak
corporate profits and declines in production, new orders and employment in the
industrial sector during June. The DJIA fell by 2.33% on April 14, 1988, following
the announcement of the increase in the US trade deficit in February ($13.8 billion).
3.2.6 The September 11 Terrorist Attacks
The terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001 affected stock markets around
the world. The US markets remained closed for four days, whereas the European
markets decided to remain open but felt the consequences of the terrorist attacks.
The DJIA fell by “only” 7.13% when the US markets reopened on September 17,
2001. Indeed, the US stock markets were supported by the interventions of the central
banks, in particular the Fed16 and the European Central Bank, which lowered their
interest rates, and by technical provisions on the repurchases of shares by companies.
Such provisions are generally used to prevent a stock market crash. Moreover, the
authorities intervened to dissuade the banks and trust companies from lending their
securities to speculative funds, to discourage short selling transactions, which amplify
market plunges.
3.2.7 Bankruptcy
The major banks’ rejection of the plan to buy out United Airlines can explain the
considerable losses in the DJIA (-6.91%) on October 13, 1989. The crash was
apparently caused by a reaction to a news story about the break-down of a $6.75 billion
leveraged buy-out deal for United Continental Holdings (UAL) Corporation, the parent
16The Fed took steps to provide a high level of liquidity ($100 billion) through the US banking and
financial sector. The Fed policy thus calmed and stabilized the economy (Chen and Siems, 2004). On
September 14, the Fed encouraged the banks to grant appropriations to the solvent borrowers and to
modify the initial terms of the credit terms and other transactions, in particular lengthening the duration
of repayment and reorganization of debt. See Chesney et al. (2011) for a discussion of the impact of
terrorism on financial markets.
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company of United Airlines. Wall Street (+3.40% for DJIA) rebounds the October 16,
1989, with a very high trading volume (416.29 million shares).
3.2.8 Regulation
After an eleven-day interruption due to National Banking holiday,17 the NYSE re-
opened on March 15, 1933, with a strong rise (+15:34% for the DJIA). It seems that
the measures adopted by President Franklin Roosevelt to solve the banking crisis and
to balance the budget reassured investors, especially the Emergency Banking Act or
the Glass-Steagall Act18 (law to banks from engaging in speculation). These measures
placed the market under governmental control, created restrictions on advances that
brokers could receive and obliged brokers and the members of Stock Exchange to file
daily reports on bank loans.19
3.2.9 Miscellaneous
The fall of the DJIA (-3.29%) on February 27, 2007, can be explained by the
collapse of Shanghai Stock Exchange due to the tightening of monetary policy of
the Chinese government. Further, Alan Greenspan, former Fed’s Chairman, declares
that a recession could affect the US economy. Finally, investors are concerned about
the shortcomings of high-risk loans ("subprime mortgage") granted to households
less creditworthy. The two largest mortgage agencies Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae
17On March 6, 1933, the President Franklin Roosevelt imposes the closing of all the American banks
for four days (banking holiday) which necessarily implies the closing the stock markets. For a discussion
of the National banking holiday see Wigmore (1987), Schwert (1989b) and Butkiewicz (1999), inter alia.
18The Glass-Steagall Act, also called Banking Act of 1933, instituted incompatibility between trading
by deposit and investment banks; created the federal system of bank deposit insurance (the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC); introduced the leveling off of the interest rates on bank deposits
(Regulation Q). The Regulation was repealed in 1980 by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act, and the Glass-Steagall Act was abrogated on November 12, 1999, by the Financial
Services Modernization Act (or Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). See Moshirian (2011) for a discussion of
regulations and market development.
19Thereafter, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) – the federal organization of regulation
and control of the financial markets – was created on June 6, 1934.
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announced that they would tighten the criteria for this type of refinancing loans. The
US equity markets (-5.55% for DJIA) have fallen quickly in reaction to the Standard
& Poor’s decision to downgrade the US credit rating from AAA to AA+.
4 Volatility changes in the DJIA
We find that some negative and positive high returns experienced by the DJIA are
not identified as outliers, namely as extraordinary (rare) movements, due to the very
high volatility of some periods (see, e.g., Officer, 1973; Schwert, 1989a). This can be
explained by differing consequences and perceptions of the investors when the market
is experiencing high volatility rather than low volatility or stability. Therefore, we
use an appropriate methodology to identify breakpoints and sudden shifts in volatility
of the DJIA. A relatively recent approach to test for volatility shifts is the iterative
cumulative sums of squares (ICSS) algorithm proposed by Inclán and Tiao (1994) and
improves by Sansó et al. (2004). This algorithm allows the detection of multiple
breakpoints in variance and has been used extensively to identify changes in volatility
of financial time series (Fernandez, 2006; Hammoumdeh and Li, 2008; Kasman, 2009,
among others).20 Nevertheless, Rodrigues and Rubia (2011) show that the asymptotic
distribution of the ICSS test statistics varies under additive outliers. The critical
values from this distribution generally prove inadequate for the test, which finds too
many breaks.21 Therefore, using the outlier-adjusted DJIA return series, we apply the
modified ICSS algorithm to detect sudden changes in volatility.
4.1 Sudden change detection
The most popular statistical methods specifically designed to detect breaks in volatil-
ity are CUSUM-type tests. As underlined by Rodrigues and Rubia (2011), the ability
20Haugen et al. (1991) used the methodology developed by Wichern et al. (1976) for identifying
variance change points in the DJIA over the period 1897–1988.
21Further, Inclán and Tiao (1994) advised that “it is advisable to complement the search for variance
changes with a procedure for outlier detection”.
19
of the CUSUM tests to identify structural changes depends of the underlying assump-
tions. Financial data display a time varying volatility pattern, known as volatility clus-
tering. Andreou and Ghysels (2002) illustrate the pervasive effect of persistent volatil-
ity on CUSUM-type tests experimentally. Their results indicate that the Kokoszka and
Leipus (2000) test is robust to conditional heteroscedasticity. Sansó et al. (2004) pro-
pose a more general test than that of Kokoszka and Leipus (2000) based on the iterative
cumulative sum of squares (ICSS) algorithm developed by Inclán and Tiao (1994).
Let ri;t = 100 log(Pi;t=Pi;t 1), where Pi;t is the price of the index i at the time t,
so that rt is the percent return of the index i from period t   1 to t. frtg is then
assumed to be a series of independent observations from a normal distribution with
zero mean and unconditional variance s2t for t = 1; : : : ;T . Assume that the variance
within each interval is denoted by s2j , j= 0;1; : : : ;NT , where NT is the total number of
variance changes, and 1 < k1 < k2 <    < kNT < T are the set of breakpoints. Then
the variances over the NT intervals are defined as
s2t =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
s20; 1< t < k1
s21; k1 < t < k2
: : :
s2NT ; kNT < t < T
The cumulative sum of squares is used to estimate the number of variance changes and
to detect the point in time of each variance shift. The cumulative sum of the squared
observations from the beginning of the series to the kth point in time is expressed as
Ck = åkt=1 r2t for k = 1; : : : ;T . To test the null hypothesis of constant unconditional
variance, the Inclán–Tiao statistic is given by:
IT = sup
k
j
p
T=2Dkj (9)
where Dk =
 Ck
CT
    kT , with CT is the sum of the squared residuals from the whole
sample period. The value of k that maximizes jpT=2Dkj is the estimate of the break
date. The ICSS algorithm systematically looks for breakpoints along the sample. If
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there are no variance shifts over the whole sample period, Dk will oscillate around
zero. Otherwise, if there are one or more variance shifts, Dk will deviate from
zero. The asymptotic distribution of the IT statistic is given by supr jW (r)j, where
W (r) =W (r)  rW (1) is a Brownian bridge andW (r) is standard Brownian motion.
Finite-sample critical values can be generated by simulation.
The IT statistic is designed for i.i.d. processes, which is a very strong assumption
for financial data, in which there is evidence of conditional heteroscedasticity. Sansó et
al. (2004) show that the size distortions are important for heteroscedastic conditional
variance processes from Monte Carlo simulations. Their results thus invalidate the
practical use of this test for financial time series. To overcome this problem, Sansó et
al. (2004) propose a new test that explicitly consider the fourth moment properties
of the disturbances and the conditional heteroscedasticity.22 They propose a non-
parametric adjustment to the IT statistic that allows rt to obey a wide class of
dependent processes under the null hypothesis. Consistent with Sansó et al. (2004),
we use a non-parametric adjustment based on the Bartlett kernel, and the adjusted
statistic23 is given by:
AIT = supkjT 0:5Gkj (10)
whereGk = lˆ 0:5
h
Ck 
  k
T

CT
i
, lˆ= gˆ0+2åml=1

1 l(m+1) 1gˆl , gˆl =T 1åTt=l+1(r2t  
sˆ2)(r2t l  sˆ2), sˆ2 = T 1CT , and the lag truncation parameter m is selected using the
procedure in Newey and West (1994). Under general conditions, the asymptotic dis-
tribution of AIT statistic is also given by suprjW (r)j, and finite-sample critical values
can be generated by simulation.
22Bacmann and Dubois (2002) show that one way to circumvent this problem is by filtering the return
series by a GARCH (1,1) model, and applying the ICSS algorithm developed by Inclán and Tiao (1994)
to the standardized residuals obtained from the estimation. Fernandez (2006) proposes an alternative
approach to testing for variance homogeneity based on wavelet analysis.
23This adjusted statistic is equivalent to the non-parametric test proposed by Kokoszka and Leipus
(2000).
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4.2 Sudden changes in the DJIA
As suggested by Rodrigues and Rubia (2011), the modified ICSS algorithm proposed
by Sansó et al. (2004) is applied on outlier-adjusted returns of DJIA. Table 5 displays
the time periods of a shift in DJIA volatility, and descriptive statistics for the return
series on sub-periods identified from volatility shifts. The modified ICSS algorithm
finds changes in volatility, with periods of low, medium and high volatility, especially
episodes of high volatility occurring during the 1929-1934 recession, the 1937-1938
contraction, and the period of the 2007-08 financial crisis24 and the related recession
(2007-2011). Figure (2 displays the conditional variance for each sub-periods. This
result confirms the findings of Schwert (1989a,b) and Hamilton and Lin (1996) that
volatility of stock returns increases during (severe) recessions. Episodes of higher
volatility occur in the 1929-1934 and 1937-1938, with a standard deviation of 0.020,
present at least twice the volatility as the other periods, as found by Schwert (1989b)
(see also Officer, 1973; Schwert, 1989a, 1998).25 Voth (2003) advocates that this
high volatility can be explained by the political uncertainty. Further, we show that the
2007–2011 period is associated with very high levels of volatility (standard deviation
of 0.016) then the DJIA returns to a period of “normal” (or less high). The 2007–2011
period seems to be characterized by prolonged periods (many years) of high volatility,
as for the 1929-1934 recession period, but with a slightly less level of volatility.26 We
also observe a long "tranquil" period from 1942 to 1972. All the returns in the sub-
periods exhibit excess skewness, excess kurtosis and conditional heteroscedasticity.
24See, e.g., Bartram and Bodnar (2009) andMishkin (2010) for a discussion of the 2008–2009 financial
crisis.
25Schwert (1989b) finds that the sub-periods 1929-1934 and 1937-1938 exhibit high volatility from a
switching-regime Markov model (with two regimes) for a monthly constructed stock-return series based
largely on data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for the 1834–1987 period.
26Schwert (2011) uses monthly returns of a daily index of New York Stock Exchange-listed stocks
from 1885–2010, principally based on data from the CRSP and the S&P 500. He finds contrast between
the period following the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Depression in terms of standard deviation.
Andrada et al. (2012) also finds that the 1929-1934 period exhibits sharper tail events than the 2007-2011
period by analyzing the historical distributions of the DJIA.
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5 Discussion on risk management
Risk management is one of the most important innovations of the latter century. Value-
at-risk (VaR) is the most prominent of a set of risk measurement tools to be developed
in response to a series of huge, widely publicized losses at large financial firms in the
80’s.
From a statistical point of view, VaR is a quantile of the profit-loss distribution, which
can be derived for any specific level of significance (a) and time horizon.27 Financial
managers estimate the quantile of the left lower-sided tail, as a representation of worst
losses for a given (a). Providing an accurate estimate of VaR is crucial. If the underly-
ing risk is not properly estimated, this may lead to a suboptimal capital allocation with
consequences on the profitability or the financial stability of the institutions and if risk
is overestimated, then it may further lead to unnecessary extra capital requirements.
The parametric methods for estimating VaR assume one particular distribution for
the data series. The Gaussian approach implies that the returns follow a Gaussian
distribution. As it is well known that the standard deviation of the returns change over
time, we have to use models that explicitly allow the standard deviation to change of
time that provide better forecasts of variance and by extension better measures of VaR
(Engle, 2011).
Nevertheless, the presence of outliers may have undesirable effects on the estimates
of the parameters of the equation governing volatility dynamics (see, e.g., Friedman
and Laibson, 1989; Van Dijk et al., 1999; Mendes, 2000; Ng and McAleer, 2004;
Charles, 2008), the tests of conditional homoscedasticity (see, e.g., van Dijk et al.,
1999; Carnero et al., 2001, 2007), and the out-of-sample volatility forecasts (see, e.g.,
Franses and Ghijsels, 1999; Carnero et al., 2007; Catalán and Trívez, 2007; Charles,
2008).28
27VaR quantifies the potential loss for a portfolio of assets (rt ) under normal market condition over a
given period of time horizon hwith a certain confidence level (1 a), at time t conditionnally on available
information Wt 1: Pf(rt VaRt;h(a)jWt 1g.
28Estrada (2009) show that a few outliers have a massive impact on long term performance from the
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As one of the important steps in the estimation of VaR involves obtaining an estimate
of the volatility, we illustrate the effect of the outliers in estimating VaR. Our in-
sample period runs from October 2, 1928 to December 31, 2011, while the out-of-
sample period runs from January 02, 2013. We estimate one-day-ahead VaR from
(1) original returns, and (2) free-outlier returns, based on GJR-GARCH model29 and
daily squared returns as proxy of daily volatility.30 For comparison we use mean VaR
(VaR), the failure ratio which is the percentage of negative returns smaller than on-
step-ahead VaR, the LR Kupiec and DQ stat are the Kupiec (1995) likelihood ratio
test and the dynamic quantile (DQ) test of Engle and Manganelli (2004), respectively,
for the VaR evaluations (also known as backtests) under 95% and 99% confidence
levels. However, the VaR is not considered as a coherent measure of risk in the sense
of Artzner et al. (1999).31 Expected shortfall is a coherent measure of risk and it is
defined as the expected value of the losses conditional on the loss being larger than
the VaR.32 Hendricks (1996) indicates that two measures can be constructed: (i) the
expected value of loss exceeding the VaR level (ESF1), and (ii) the expected value
of loss exceeding the VaR level, divided by the associated VaR values (ESF2). The
results in Table 2 show that the risk measures based on outlier-free data are better than
those from original data. These results suggest that taking into account the outliers is
important for risk managers with respect to risk measure assessment, such as VaR and
expected shortfall.
We also compare the different sub-periods with some in-sample risk measures
(VaR and ES) under 95% confidence level. Table 6 displays the results and confirms
DJIA over the 1900-2006 period.
29We do not search the best volatility models for computing VaR, but this point will be examined in
future research.
30Our results are not sensitive to the choice of volatility proxy.
31In the properties a coherent measure functional must satisfy on an appropriate probabilistic space,
the sub-additivity property does not hold for all cases. Specific portfolios can be constructed where the
risk of a portfolio with two assets can be greater than the sum of the individual risks therefore, violating
sub-additivity and in general the diversification principle (Scaillet, 2000).
32The expected shortfall is defined as: ESFt = E(jLt j> jVaRt j), where Lt is the expected value of loss
if a VaRt violation occurs.
24
that the three periods of high volatility, i.e. 1929-1934, 1937-1938 and 2008-2011, are
riskier because they exhibit higher risk measures, especially the mean VaR (VaR) and
the expected shortfall (ESF1). Further, the periods with low volatility, i.e. 1942-1972,
2003-2207 and 2001-2013, are less risky with levels of the VaR and ESF1 sometimes
two times lower than the periods of high volatility.33 These results show the relevance
of differencing the volatility regimes for risk management.
Another way to estimate the VaR is the extreme value theory (EVT). Indeed the
Gaussian method can fail when the return distribution is fat-tailed. The EVT provides
statistical tools to estimate the tails of probability distribution. As underlined by
Gonzalo and Olmo (2004), the first task is to identify which values are really extreme.
The authors propose a formal way of identifying and estimating the extreme values
of any random sample of size n coming from a distribution function (F) that is to
distinguish between extreme returns and outlying returns. They provide accurate
approximations of the extreme quantiles of F and show that identification of the real
extreme observations allows to estimate a VaR very accurately.
6 Conclusion
This study examined the kinds of events that cause large shocks, considered as black
swans or rare events, in the volatility of the DJIA index between October 2, 1928
and August 30, 2013. More precisely, from the semi-parametric procedure to detect
additive outliers proposed by Laurent, Lecourt and Palm (LLP) (2013) based on
the GJR model, we determined when these (positive and negative) large changes
in volatility of daily returns occur during this period. We also tried to associate
the date of each outlier with a specific (economic, political or financial) event that
occurred near that date, and many of them seem to be associated with the same event
33Note that the VaR models for some sub-periods are rejected by the LR Kupiec and DQ tests. The
VaR model is not rejected for the 1937-1938 sub-period but this result should be take with caution due to
the bad small sample properties of backtesting tests.
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patterns. We found that the large volatility shocks are principally due to the major
financial crashes, the US elections, wars, monetary policies during the recessions,
macroeconomic news and declarations on the economic situation, terrorist attacks,
bankruptcy, and regulation. This finding suggests that these large shocks should be
thus taken into account in modelling volatility of returns along with in macro-finance
models.
We also showed that some shocks were not identified as extraordinary movements due
to their occurring during high volatility episodes, especially the 1929-1934, 1937-1938
and 2007-2011 periods, identified from the ICSS algorithm. This can be explained
by differing consequences and perceptions of the investors on larger changes in
percentage when the market is within a high volatility period compared with a low
volatility period or a stable period, especially in a context of uncertainty about the
future profitability of equities and their risk. Further, in contrast to Schwert (2011),
we showed that the period of the 2007-08 financial crisis and the related recession
(2007-2011) exhibit the same characteristic than the 1929-1934 recession period: very
high levels of volatility on prolonged periods (many years). This study focuses on
the events that cause large shocks in the volatility of US stock market. It will be
interesting to study others stock markets and/or financial markets, such as bond and
foreign exchange rate markets, to compare the market’s reactions to such events.
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Figure 1: Daily returns of DJIA – 1928-2013
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Table 1: Summary statistics of the DJIA: 1928–2013.
Series Mean (%) St. dev. Min. Max. Skewness Excess Kurtosis LM(10)
Non-adjusted 0.0259 0.012 -0.226 0.153 -0.169 20.87 2738.9
Outlier-adjusted 0.0302 0.011 -0.107 0.114 -0.026 9.01 4329.9
Notes:  and  mean significant at 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Table 2: Out-of-sample results for risk measures.
Series Quantile VaR Failure LR p-value DQ p-value ESF1 ESF2
ratio Kupiec Kupiec stat DQ
Non-adjusted 5% -1.212 0.044 0.382 0.537 0.366 0.545 -1.590 1.440
1% -1.716 0.025 7.213 0.007 10.27 0.001 -1.787 1.172
Outlier-adjusted 5% -1.195 0.048 0.028 0.868 0.027 0.869 -1.532 1.447
1% -1.692 0.025 7.213 0.007 10.27 0.001 -1.787 1.217
Notes: The risk measures are computed under 95% and 99% confidence levels, i.e. 5% and 1% quantiles, on the 2012-
2013 period. VaR denotes the mean on-step-ahead VaR, the failure ratio is the percentage of negative returns smaller
than on-step-ahead VaR, LR Kupiec and DQ stat are the Kupiec (1995) likelihood ratio test and the dynamic quantile
(DQ) test of Engle andManganelli (2004), respectively, for the VaR evaluations. ESF1 and ESF2 are expected shortfall
measures defined as the expected value of loss exceeding the VaR level and the expected value of loss exceeding the
VaR level, divided by the associated VaR values, respectively.
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Table 3: Large shocks detected in the DJIA: 1928–1948.
Point Percent
Date t-stat Change Change Events
10/28/1929 5.48 -40.58 -13.47 Black Monday
10/29/1929 4.95 -30.57 -11.73 Black Tuesday
10/30/1929 4.87 28.40 12.34 Massive purchases of stocks
06/16/1930 4.46 -19.64 -7.87 Hoover’s announcement that he would sign
the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act
06/22/1931 5.52 15.51 11.90 Hoover debt moratorium proposal
10/06/1931 4.79 12.86 14.87 Noise of constitution of banking syndicate
03/15/1933 5.65 8.26 15.34 End of National banking holiday and Glass-Steagall Act
07/26/1934 4.34 -6.06 -6.62 Fear of European conflict
01/23/1939 5.99 -7.79 -5.22 Spanish Civil War
09/05/1939 6.68 12.87 9.52 European conflict
05/10/1940 4.27 -3.40 -2.30 World War II
05/13/1940 7.26 -7.14 -4.93 World War II
05/14/1940 8.16 -9.36 -6.80 World War II
05/17/1940 5.12 -6.23 -4.78 World War II
05/21/1940 5.54 -8.30 -6.78 World War II
11/07/1940 5.41 5.77 4.37 Roosevelt’s reelection
04/09/1943 5.71 -4.30 -3.17 Roosevelt’s anti-inflation order
09/03/1946 5.92 -10.51 -5.56 Labor unrest in maritime and trucking industries
04/14/1947 5.27 -6.74 -3.89 Worsening of economic situation
11/03/1948 6.43 -7.30 -3.85 Truman defeats Dewey
11/05/1948 4.61 -6.16 -3.34 Fear of reestablishment of earning taxes
Notes: The t-statistics are compared to the 5% critical value equal to 4.16 computed by Laurent et al. (2013).
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Table 4: Large shocks detected in the DJIA: 1949–2013.
Point Percent
Date t-stat Change Change Events
06/26/1950 7.36 -10.44 -4.65 Outbreak of Korean War
06/29/1950 4.87 -7.96 -3.71 North Korea tanks entered Seoul; fear of long war
09/26/1955 15.07 -31.89 -6.54 Eisenhower’s heart attack
09/27/1955 4.29 10.37 2.28 Good news of the Eisenhower’s health
05/28/1962 4.66 -34.95 -5.71 Kennedy forces rollback of steel price hike
11/22/1963 -11.38 -21.16 -2.89 President Kennedy’s assassination
11/26/1963 22.59 32.03 4.50 Arrestation of the Kennedy’s assassin
08/16/1971 3.85 32.93 3.85 Nixon anti-inflationary program
08/17/1982 5.57 38.81 4.90 Crisis of the debt; fall in interest rate
10/06/1982 4.22 37.07 4.09 Expectation of further decline of interest rates
07/07/1986 4.51 -61.87 -3.26 Fear on the US economy
09/11/1986 5.54 -86.61 -4.61 Fear of fall in interest rate and inflation
10/19/1987 11.87 -507.99 -22.61 Fear of a new decline of dollar
10/21/1987 4.95 186.84 10.15 Fall in interest rates
04/14/1988 4.90 -101.46 -2.33 Increase of trade deficit
10/13/1989 12.30 -190.58 -6.91 Rejection of repurchase plan of United Airlines
10/16/1989 5.08 88.12 3.43 Rebound
01/17/1991 4.79 114.60 4.57 Operation Desert Storm
11/15/1991 7.55 -120.31 -3.93 Bad economic statistics; fear of economic stagnation
02/04/1994 5.60 -96.24 -2.43 Unexpectedly rise of interest rates
03/08/1996 4.43 -171.24 -3.04 Surprisingly sharp rise in job numbers
10/27/1997 6.00 -554.26 -7.18 Asian crisis
08/31/1998 4.66 -512.61 -6.37 Deterioration of Asian and Russian crises
09/17/2001 5.97 -684.81 -7.13 The September 11 terrorist attacks
02/27/2007 7.58 -416.02 -3.29 Fall of Shanghai Stock Exchange; fear of recession
08/08/2011 4.44 -634.76 -5.55 S&P downgrades the US credit rating
Notes: The t-statistics are compared to the 5% critical value equal to 4.16 computed by Laurent et al. (2013).
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Table 5: Sudden changes in DJIA volatility and summary statistics on sub-periods.
Dates of volatility Mean St. dev. Min. Max. Skewness Excess LM(10)
change breaks regimes (%) Kurtosis
10/02/1928–10/16/1934 high -0.030 0.025 -0.135 0.153 -0.354 4.30 157.1
10/17/1934–08/25/1937 medium 0.095 0.010 -0.037 0.029 -0.446 1.13 9.9
08/26/1937–10/05/1938 high -0.052 0.021 -0.072 0.061 -0.217 0.53 16.3
10/06/1938–07/08/1942 medium -0.028 0.011 -0.068 0.095 -0.031 10.73 48.9
07/09/1942–12/27/1972 low 0.032 0.007 -0.065 0.051 -0.422 5.77 595.6
12/29/1972–12/15/1995 medium 0.030 0.010 -0.226 0.101 -1.853 49.53 374.2
12/18/1995–04/02/2003 medium+ 0.033 0.012 -0.072 0.064 -0.132 3.05 157.8
04/03/2003–07/09/2007 low 0.048 0.007 -0.033 0.022 -0.088 0.86 31.3
07/10/2007–12/20/2011 high 0.002 0.016 -0.079 0.111 0.197 6.90 189.3
12/21/2011–08/30/2013 low 0.048 0.007 -0.024 0.024 -0.097 1.20 15.35
Notes:  and  mean significant at 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 6: In-sample results for risk measures on sub-periods.
Sub-periods VaR Failure LR p-value DQ p-value ESF1 ESF2
ratio Kupiec Kupiec stat DQ
10/02/1928–10/16/1934 -4.853 0.061 3.700 0.054 31.53 0.000 -4.445 1.372
10/17/1934–08/25/1937 -2.134 0.059 1.073 0.300 10.22 0.116 -1.971 1.474
08/26/1937–10/05/1938 -4.647 0.061 0.635 0.425 3.174 0.787 -4.459 1.441
10/06/1938–07/08/1942 -2.570 0.079 4.130 0.042 16.86 0.001 -2.349 1.319
07/09/1942–12/27/1972 -1.195 0.064 1.108 0.293 18.29 0.006 -1.223 1.520
12/29/1972–12/15/1995 -2.126 0.054 0.074 0.786 27.88 0.000 -2.157 1.211
12/18/1995–04/02/2003 -1.563 0.064 1.108 0.293 5.134 0.527 -1.477 1.470
04/03/2003–07/09/2007 -1.512 0.064 1.108 0.293 6.202 0.401 -1.436 1.247
07/10/2007–12/20/2011 -2.637 0.075 3.215 0.073 14.62 0.024 -2.353 1.289
12/21/2011–08/30/2013 -1.424 0.061 0.635 0.425 3.174 0.787 -1.450 1.446
Notes: The risk measures are computed under 95% confidence level. VaR denotes the mean on-step-ahead VaR, the
failure ratio is the percentage of negative returns smaller than on-step-ahead VaR, LR Kupiec and DQ stat are the
Kupiec (1995) likelihood ratio test and the dynamic quantile (DQ) test of Engle and Manganelli (2004), respectively,
for the VaR evaluations. ESF1 and ESF2 are expected shortfall measures defined as the expected value of loss
exceeding the VaR level and the expected value of loss exceeding the VaR level, divided by the associated VaR values,
respectively.
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Figure 2: Conditional volatility of DJIA – 1928-2013
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Table 7: Largest daily percentage changes and losses on the DJIA, October 1928 –
December 2010.
Largest changes Largest losses
Rank Date % change Date % change
1 19/10/1987 -22.61 19/10/1987 -22.61
2 15/03/1933 +15.34 28/10/1929 -12.82
3 06/10/1931 +14.87 29/10/1929 -11.73
4 28/10/1929 -12.82 10/05/1931 -10.74
5 31/10/1929 +12.34 06/11/1929 -9.92
6 29/10/1929 -11.73 12/08/1932 -8.40
7 21/09/1932 +11.36 26/10/1987 -8.04
8 13/10/2008 +11.08 15/10/2008 -7.87
9 28/10/2008 +10.88 21/07/1933 -7.84
10 10/05/1931 -10.74 01/12/2008 -7.70
10 21/10/1987 +10.15 09/10/2008 -7.33
11 06/11/1929 -9.92 18/10/1937 -7.20
12 03/08/1932 +9.52 27/10/1997 -7.18
13 11/02/1932 +9.47 05/10/1932 -7.15
14 14/11/1929 +9.36 17/09/2001 -7.13
15 18/12/1931 +9.35 24/09/1931 -7.07
16 13/02/1932 +9.19 20/07/1933 -7.07
17 06/05/1932 +9.08 29/09/2008 -6.98
18 19/04/1933 +9.03 13/10/1989 -6.91
19 08/10/1931 +8.70 08/01/1988 -6.85
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